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INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act [H.R. 4173] (“The Act” or
“Dodd-Frank”).1 The Act became effective July 22, 2010.2 In the wake of the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress sought to reform
the regulatory environment of U.S. financial markets.3 The Act, among other
things, amended the most fundamental term in all of securities law, the
definition of “security.”4 However, with respect to security-based swaps,
Dodd-Frank only amended the definition of “security” under the Securities
Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Exchange Act”).5 By inserting the term “security-based swap” into each
statute’s definition, Congress unambiguously brought credit default swaps
under their regulatory regimes.6 Yet, Congress did not amend the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) to include the term “security-based
swap,” nor did it similarly amend the Investment Company Act of 1940.7
Thus, whether a credit default swap based on an underlying debt security is
itself a “security” for purposes of these latter statutes remains an open question. Accordingly, this Article explores the application of the definition of
“security” in the Advisers Act to such swaps by: (1) investigating the role the
definition of “security” plays in the definition of “investment adviser” and
subsequent application of section 206 of the Advisers Act; (2) examining
possible textual bases for concluding that credit default swaps are “securities”
under the Advisers Act; and (3) arguing why clearer Congressional intent
is not necessary to define a credit default swap as a “security” under the
Advisers Act.
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court long ago held that, under the Advisers Act, an
investment adviser is a fiduciary.8 The purpose of the Advisers Act, among
other things, “was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
1

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id. §§ 761(a)(2), 768(a)(1).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. §§769–770.
8
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
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ethics in the securities industry.”9 In promulgating the Advisers Act, Congress found that “investment advisers could not completely perform their
basic function—furnishing to clients on a personal basis competent, unbiased,
and continuous advice regarding the sound management of their investments—unless all conflicts of interest between the investment counsel and
the client were removed.”10 Accordingly, the more specific purpose of the
Advisers Act was to prohibit any practice that operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any client or prospective client, and to eliminate conflicts of interest
between the investment adviser and the client.11 To enforce this tenet, Congress provided the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC,”
“Agency,” or “Commission”) with section 206 of the Advisers Act, the central antifraud provision of the statute.12 However, section 206 is inapposite
if there is no jurisdictional basis for its invocation. Accordingly, the remainder of this Article seeks to address this jurisdictional question by exploring
whether a person is subject to section 206 of the Advisers Act if he or she
solely renders advice regarding credit default swaps.
To charge a firm with violating section 206 of the Advisers Act, it must
meet the definition of “investment adviser.”13 Section 206 states that “it shall
be unlawful for any investment adviser” to engage in the transactions
described in section 206(1)–(4), which establishes that being an investment adviser is a condition precedent to violating section 206.14 An investment adviser is:
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value
of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business,
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities ….15

Id. at 186.
Id. at 187 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 28 (1939) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
11
See id. at 191–92.
12
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 §206, 15 U.S.C. §80b-6 (2012).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012). Though not relevant here, the Act makes certain
exclusions from the definition of “investment adviser.” In general, and subject to
certain conditions, any bank, bank holding company, lawyer, accountant, engineer,
teacher, broker-dealer, publisher, adviser with respect to government guaranteed securities,
nationally recognized statistical rating organization, family office, or such other persons not
within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and regulations
or order, are excluded from the definition. See id.§80b-2(a)(11)(A)–(H).
9

10
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Accordingly, a firm would meet the definition of “investment adviser” if
it: (1) was engaged in the business of advising others; (2) on securities; and
(3) was compensated for such advice. Since the financial crisis of 2008,16
the SEC has investigated firms that design and execute an investment strategy on behalf of a pooled investment vehicle, the main purpose of which
is to purchase or sell credit default swaps (“CDSs”).17 In exchange for executing this investment strategy, the fund pays the firm a management fee
based on total assets under management.18 The key fact pattern at issue here
is one where, besides the CDSs, the firm is not engaged in advising the fund
on any other financial instrument. Under these facts, firms are receiving
fee-based compensation for being engaged in the business of advising funds
on selling CDSs. Thus, they have satisfied the business and compensation
elements of the definition of “investment adviser.” Therefore, whether such
a firm meets the definition of “investment adviser” turns upon whether the
CDSs in question meet the definition of “security” under section 202(a)(18)
of the Advisers Act.
Whether a CDS meets the definition of “security” under the Advisers Act
is a novel question of law. The term “credit default swap” does not appear in
the definition of “security” under the Advisers Act:
“Security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security (including a
certificate of deposit) or on any group or index of securities (including
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guaranty of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of
the foregoing.19

16

Also known as the “Great Recession.” See Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman, Fed.
Reserve Bd., Testimony at a Conference Sponsored by the Swedish Ministry of Finance,
Stockholm, Sweden, The Great Recession: Moving Ahead (Aug. 11, 2014).
17
See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 9493, 2013 WL 6503674 (Dec. 12, 2013); In re UBS Securities LLC, Exchange Act
Release No. 3643, 2013 WL 3992459 (Aug. 6, 2013).
18
SEC, Investment Advisors: What You Need to Know Before Choosing One, http://
www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/invadvisers.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
19
15 U.S.C.§80b-2(a)(18).
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A CDS is a credit derivative,20 and more specifically, it is a type of swap.
Unlike some other terms commonly associated with derivatives regulated
by the SEC, such as put, call, straddle, option, and privilege, the term “swap”
does not appear in the Advisers Act’s definition of “security,” despite its
inclusion in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.21 Moreover, federal
courts have not addressed the status of CDSs as securities under the Advisers Act in any significant way. Thus, jurists must interpret the text of
section 202(a)(18).
II. ANALYSIS
Certain CDSs are “securities” within the meaning of section 202(a)(18)
of the Advisers Act.22 In every case involving construction of a statute, the
starting point is the language itself.23 Accordingly, there are two theories
rooted in the text of section 202(a)(18) which support defining certain
CDSs as “securities.” First, CDSs are the equivalent of an option, and are
thus covered by the options language of the statute.24 Alternatively, CDSs
are evidences of indebtedness.25 Both theories have their merits and are
analyzed below.
A. Options Clause
Most convincingly, Congress has adopted the position that a securitybased CDS is the equivalent of an option, and is therefore a security by
virtue of the options language contained in section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers
Act. The definition of “security” in the Advisers Act is unambiguous and
contains the following “derivatives clause”26: “‘Security’ means any ... put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security (including a certificate of
deposit) or on any group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof) ….”27
20
JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 86–87 (Vicki
Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2009).
21
See 15 U.S.C. §§77b(a)(1),78c(a)(10) (2012).
22
See 15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(18).
23
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
24
See infra Part II.A.
25
See infra Part II.B.
26
It does not appear that any other authority refers to this clause as the “derivatives
clause” or “options clause.” See generally An Act to Clarify the Jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Definition of Security, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409
(1982); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-626(I) (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2780;
H.R. REP. NO. 97-626(II) (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2792.
27
15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(18).
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Significantly, when Congress passed Dodd-Frank, it adopted the position
that swaps, including CDSs, are the equivalent of options:
In general ... the term “swap” means any agreement, contract, or
transaction ... that is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar option of
any kind that is for the purchase or sale, or based on the value, of 1 or
more ... securities ... including any agreement, contract, or transaction
commonly known as ... a credit default swap.28

Furthermore, the Advisers Act incorporates this definition by reference
in section 202(a)(29)29 of the Advisers Act.30 Thus, Congress believes that
security-based CDSs are the equivalent of security-based options, and
because it is well settled that the latter is a “security,” so too is the former.
To explain further, the options clause was inserted into the federal securities laws to clarify, inter alia, the SEC’s plenary jurisdiction over security-based options.31 On this point, the Second Circuit has held that options on
underlying securities are themselves securities.32 Thus, since Dodd-Frank
clarified that CDSs were a specialized type of option, a security-based CDS
is a security-based option and therefore a security.
What is more, the same argument can be articulated in a slightly different
way: a CDS is a derivative. As discussed above, the term option appears in
what can be said to be the derivatives clause of the definition of “security.”
Derivatives may be traded on an exchange (“exchange traded”) or negotiated
between private parties (“over the counter” or “OTC”).33 Depending on
the underlying asset, some derivatives meet the definition of “security.”
Thus, they are “covered derivatives.”34 Covered derivatives are financial
instruments that derive value from the securities on which they are based.35
28

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
721(a)(21), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012); see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(B)(x) (2012)
(excluding security-based swaps from the definition of “swap”).
29
The Advisers Act contains a scrivenerಬs error where a second subparagraph (29)
appears after subparagraph (30) instead of being codified as subparagraph (31). See 15
U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(29) (2012).
30
See also 15 U.S.C. §§77b(a)(17), 78c(a)(69), 80a-2(54) (2012).
31
See An Act to Clarify the Jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Definition of Security, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 97-626(I) (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2780; H.R. REP. NO. 97-626(II)
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2792.
32
See Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 325–27 (2d Cir. 2002).
33
COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 80.
34
The term “covered derivatives” is used to identify those derivatives under the jurisdiction
of the federal securities laws.
35
See Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies, Release No. 29776, 101
SEC Docket 3523, 2011 WL 3855065 at *2 & n.3 (2011) (concept release) (“Derivatives
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The underlying asset may be a particular stock, a stock index, or a fixedincome security such as a bond. 36 Derivatives provide opportunities to
speculate in the financial markets, as well as to hedge a position in the underlying asset.37 For example, stock options are derivatives.38 An option contract
on stock is also a “security.”39 Hence, a stock option is a covered derivative.
A swap is another type of derivative.40 It is a negotiated arrangement
between two parties in which each promises to make a payment to the other,
with the payments occurring at different times and determined under different
formulas.41 As mentioned above, the underlying asset of a derivative may
be a fixed-income security. 42 These instruments are credit derivatives.43
The CDS is the most common type of credit derivative.44 Simply put, “the
credit default swap is an unregulated form of insurance against default.”45
The buyer of the contract is seeking credit protection against a fixed-income
security, typically a bond.46 This protection is provided by the seller of the
swap.47 The seller is known as the long counterparty, and the buyer is known as
the short counterparty. 48 The arrangement enables the buyer of a swap
contract to transfer the risk of default on the bond to the seller of the swap
contract.49 Finally, the short counterparty is not required to hold the underlying referenced asset; that is, the short counterparty can take a synthetic position on the underlying asset.50 Thus, a security-based CDS is a “security”
may be broadly described as instruments or contracts whose value is based upon, or derived
from, some other asset or metric (referred to as the ‘underlier,’ ‘underlying,’ or ‘reference
asset’).”); see also id. at *6 & n.41.
36
COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 80.
37
Id.
38
Id.; see also Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 324–27 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that options and synthetic options are securities when their value is derived from
an underlying security).
39
COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 80.
40
Id.
41
Id. Swap payments are calculated on the basis of hypothetical quantities of the
underlying asset referred to as “notionals.” Id. at 81 (quoting Romano, A Thumbnail
Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1996)).
42
Id. at 80.
43
Release No. 29776, supra note 35, at *6 & n.41.
44
COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 87 (recognizing that swaps were not securities with
respect to registration and reporting requirements, but stating significant reforms will likely
lead to redefining credit default swaps as securities under all provisions of the securities laws).
45
Id. at 86.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 81.
49
Id. at 86.
50
Id. at 81.
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within the meaning of the derivatives clause because it is, at the very least,
a “privilege” deriving its value from a security.
Two cogent arguments flow from the same clause in section 202(a)(18)
of the Advisers Act, each leading to the same conclusion: a CDS is structured
as a derivative.51 As noted above, certain CDSs can be security-based.52 It is
well understood that when a derivative is based on an underlying security,
that is, based on the value thereof, the derivative itself is a security. As stated
in Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., options on underlying securities are themselves securities.53 Further, Caiola stands for the broader proposition that
synthetic positions based on securities are themselves securities.54
Even without Dodd-Frank’s clarification of the swap definition, the
options clause is a sufficient textual basis for defining security-based CDSs
as securities because they are the economic equivalent of an option. When
searching for the meaning and scope of the word “security,” the emphasis
should be on economic reality.55 This conclusion is significant for two reasons. First, the Commission may be compelled to take a position on
pre-Dodd-Frank conduct. Second, it applies a consistent ex ante and ex post
interpretation of the options clause relative to the passage of Dodd-Frank.
More than being the economic equivalent of an option, CDSs are the
economic equivalent of a put. Recall that section 202(a)(18) states that
the term “security” includes “any put” based on the value of a security.56
The holder of a put contract has the right to receive a contractually agreed
upon amount as long as the underlying security’s value falls below the strike
price.57 Similarly, the holder of a CDS has the right to receive the par
value of the referenced debt security on the occurrence of a negative credit
event.58 Typically, such a credit event is default. Default has the obvious
effect of driving a bond’s value to zero. In both instances, the holder of the
contract has essentially purchased protection against a decline in the value
of the underlying asset. In the first instance, it is well understood that the
51

COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 86.
See infra Part II.A.
53
See 295 F.3d 312, 325–27 (2d Cir. 2002).
54
Id. at 315–16 (“A synthetic transaction is typically a contractual agreement between
two counterparties, usually an investor and a bank, that seeks to economically replicate the
ownership and physical trading of shares and options.”).
55
See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (quoting
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
56
15 U.S.C. §80b-2(a)(18) (2012).
57
Understanding Stock Options at 6, CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE, http://
www.cboe.com/learncenter/pdf/understanding.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
58
Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to Approach the
Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 705, 729 (2008).
52
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put contract is a security.59 In the latter, the economics are no different,
and it is well settled that courts will look through form to substance to find
a security.60 Furthermore, some master agreements treat separate CDS transactions as a series of annually settled contingent put options issued by the
seller to the buyer, a contractual representation in harmony with the economic reality of the instrument itself.61 Thus, a security-based CDS is a
security by virtue of the derivatives clause.
At bottom, Congress found in section 721 of Dodd-Frank that CDSs are
options.62 Therefore, when CDSs are security-based, they are the economic
and statutory equivalent of security-based options. Moreover, in 1982,
Congress inserted the options clause in the Advisers Act, making it clear that
security-based options were securities and subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction.63
Thus, security-based CDSs are securities by virtue of the derivatives clause.
B. Evidence of Indebtedness
Alternatively, it may be perfectly reasonable to argue that a CDS is an
evidence of indebtedness. An “evidence of indebtedness” is “an obligation
to pay in the future for consideration presently received,” and the term is not
“limited to notes or other acknowledgment of debt.”64 In a swap,65 each party
agrees to pay an amount in the future in exchange for the other party’s
59

See, e.g., id. at 729–32; see generally Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312 (2d
Cir. 2002).
60
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); Reves v. Ernst & Young,
494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990) (embracing economic reality); Caiola, 295 F.3d at 325–26.
61
In practice, this author has reviewed documents between counterparties that were
based on swap contracts published by the International Swap Dealers Association. These
contracts represented the credit default swaps as “put options.” Thus, if market
participants consider security-based credit default swaps to be options, then, in the
absence of clear Congressional intent, so should the courts and the SEC.
62
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§721(a)(47), 124 Stat. 1376, 1666 (2010) § 721(a)(47).
63
15 U.S.C. §80b–2(a)(18) (2012).
64
Investment Company Act Release No. 10,666, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,128 (Apr. 27, 1979)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271) (discussing the status of reverse repurchase agreements,
firm commitment agreements, and standby commitment agreements as “senior securities”
under section 18 of the Investment Company Act. Although Release No. 10,666 limits
its evidence of indebtedness conclusions to section 18, it defines the term “evidence of
indebtedness”under section 2(a)(36). See also Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment
Companies, Release No. 29776, supra note 35, at *20 & n.57 (Aug. 31, 2011) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271) (concept release).
65
Here, the Article turns to using the broader term “swap” in lieu of “credit default swap”
as a matter of doctrinal discretion and soundness.
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promise to pay another amount in the future.66 Each party’s promise to pay
is legally enforceable under the written agreement between the parties.67 A
swap, therefore, falls within the meaning of an evidence of indebtedness
and would therefore be a “security” under the Advisers Act.68
Although the evidence of indebtedness theory would apply to all swaps
regardless of their underlying references, it is important to note that the theory
is doctrinally cabined to security-based swaps. Like options, CDSs can be
security-based and nonsecurity-based. Accordingly, the analytical approach
must be faithful to the jurisdictional divide between the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) intended by Congress.69
To determine whether an evidence of indebtedness is a security, it should
be evaluated under the Reves test.70 In 1990 the Supreme Court adopted
the four-factor family resemblance test to judge whether notes are securities.71
First, if the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business
enterprise or to finance substantial investments, and the buyer is interested
primarily in the profit the instrument is expected to generate, the instrument
is likely to be a “security.”72 Second, if the instrument is one in which there is
common trading for speculation or investment, the instrument is likely to be
a “security.”73 Third, if the investing public reasonably expects the instrument
to be a security, the instrument is likely to be a “security.”74 Finally, if there
is no other alternate regulatory regime that significantly reduces the risk of
the instrument, the instrument is likely to be a “security.”75
First, consider a security-based swap. Such a swap would be a security
because: (1) the sellers use the proceeds for general business purposes and the
buyers expect to profit from their purchase; (2) there is a market for investment
and speculation in security-based swaps; (3) as with options, the investing
66

COX ET AL., supra note 20, at 80.
Id.
68
Investment Company Act Release No. 10,666, supra note 64, at 128–31 (saying that a
swap is structurally the equivalent of two related forward contracts). Additionally, Release
No. 10,666 and 29,776 were both written with respect to the Investment Company Act of
1940. Here, the analysis is being penned with respect to the Advisers Act, but would likely be
just as applicable to the Investment Company Act.
69
See Further Definition of Swap, Securities Act Release No. 33-9338, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-67, 453, 2012 WL 2927796 (July 18, 2012); see generally, Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §929-Z,
124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010), 15 U.S.C. §78o (2012).
70
See Aiena v. Olsen, 69 F. Supp. 2d 521, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
71
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (interpreting the Exchange Act).
72
See id. at 66–67.
73
See id. at 66.
74
See id. at 66–67.
75
See id. at 67.
67
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public would reasonably expect that a swap based on a security is itself a
security; and (4) there is no other regulatory regime which significantly reduces
the risk associated with a security-based swap.76 Thus, a security-based swap,
as evidence of indebtedness, is a security.
On the other hand, the Commission would not be able to extend its
jurisdiction to nonsecurity-based swaps even though they would still be evidences of indebtedness.77 If there is no other alternate regulatory regime that
significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, the instrument is likely to be
a “security.”78 Essentially, the question is whether there is a regulatory void
with respect to nonsecurity-based CDSs. Courts tend to allow an agency to fill
statutory voids, but where there is none, the agency may go out to the four
corners of the statute and no further.79 One of the benefits of the evidence of
indebtedness analysis is that it would be applicable to all credit default swaps
without regard to the referenced asset; that is, it would sweep in nonsecurity-based CDSs. Nevertheless, there is an alternative regulatory framework
under the CFTC’s jurisdiction to deal with all nonsecurity-based CDSs.80
Accordingly, the broad definition of “swap” in the Commodity Exchange
Act brings all nonsecurity-based swaps under the CFTC’s jurisdiction.81
Thus, the fourth Reves factor is a dispositive limitation on the evidence of
indebtedness theory, cabining the SEC’s jurisdiction to security-based swaps
with respect to the Advisers Act.82
C. Statutory Construction
Certainly, if Congress’s intent is clear, then there is no need to engage in
elaborate textual analysis to determine whether a CDS is a security under the
Advisers Act. If Congress stated that security-based swaps were securities
by inserting “security-based swap” in the definition of “security” in the federal securities laws, then there would not be a need for scholarship on the
issue. However, Congress did insert “security-based swap” in the definition of “security,” but only in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.83
76

Applying the Reves test to security based swaps.
See Securities Act Release No. 33-9338, supra note 69.
78
See Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
77

See Local 705, Intಬl Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569–70 (1979).
See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1(a)(9)–(12), (47) (2012); see also Commodity Futures Trade
Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9338 at 85 (July 18, 2012).
81
See 7 U.S.C. §1(a)(47).
82
This analysis may be just as applicable to the Investment Company Act.
83
See Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 768(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C.A. §77b(a)(1) (West 2014)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I,
79
80
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Curiously, Congress chose not to insert “security-based swap” in section
202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act, nor did it insert the term in section 2(a)(36)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940.84 Some commenters may point
to this fact as an intentional omission, arguing that when Congress had the
chance in Dodd-Frank to amend the Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act, it chose not to because Congress did not believe security-based
swaps, such as CDSs, should be “securities” under these statutes. This argument lacks an appreciation of history.
Where the meaning of a statute is in doubt, similar statutes may be
construed in light of one another under the canon of statutory construction,
in pari materia.85 “[A]ll acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if
they were one law.”86 “Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they
relate to the same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or
have the same purpose or object.”87 In short, statutes are considered in pari
materia when they deal with precisely the same subject matter.88 However,
“[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”89
Generally, the federal securities statutes were enacted for the same
fundamental purpose, to promote the highest standard of ethics in the securities industry.90 Yet, certain provisions, though similar across the securities
statutes, serve different purposes. The precise purpose of the definition of
“security” in the Advisers Act is to determine when a person or entity meets
the definition of “investment adviser,” and is thereby subject to the act’s jurisdiction.91 Significantly, a unique purpose of the act was to impose a federal
fiduciary duty on investment advisers.92 Thus, the purpose of the definition
§ 3(a)(10), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b(a)(10) (West 2014))
(“security”defined, in part, as a “security-based swap”).
84
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, § 202(a)(18), 54 Stat. 847
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-2(a)(18) (West 2014)); Investment Company
Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, §2(a)(36), 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §
80a-2(a)(36) (West 2014)).
85
United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940); see also United States v. Freeman,
44 U.S. 556 (1845).
86
Stewart, 311 U.S. at 64.
87
United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 466 (6th Cir. 2010); see also United States
v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1553 (2d Cir. 1989).
88
See Stewart, 311 U.S. at 64.
89
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 & n.9 (1984).
90
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
91
See Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(11) (West 2014) (requiring that a person
or entity must give advice with respect to a “security” to meet the definition of
“investment adviser”).
92
See Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191–92.
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of “security” under the Advisers Act is to determine when the fiduciary
relationship created by the act should be imposed. By contrast, the same definition in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act determines when a financial instrument and its issuer is subject to the registration, reporting, and
disclosure purposes of those statutes.93 Because their definitions serve the
same purpose, the courts read the Securities Act and the Exchange Act in
pari materia.94 However, section 202(a)(18) is not to be read in pari materia
with section 2(a)(1)95 and Section 3(a)(10) because it is unambiguous on
its face and serves a different purpose.96 Therefore, section 202(a)(18) is to
be interpreted in isolation from the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
D. Supererogation
The doctrine of supererogation supports the conclusion that a CDS is a
security under the Advisers Act. Despite being very similar to the Advisers
Act’s definition, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act both now contain
the term “security-based swap”97 in their definitions of “security.”98 However,
it was only recently that Congress amended these statutes to expressly include
security-based swaps in their definitions of “security.”99 Significantly, from
See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (stating purpose of Securities
Act); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (stating purpose of Exchange Act).
94
See Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Danneberg Exploration Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059,
1066 (10th Cir. 1976); Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838, 843
(2d Cir. 1971); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
see also Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 561 n.11 (1982) (reserving the question
whether a financial instrument can be a security under the Investment Company Act of
1940 and not under the Securities Act or Exchange Act).
95
Notably, because section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 206 of the Advisers
Act serve the same purpose of prohibiting fraud, they have been read in pari materia. See
Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1143 (5th Cir. 1979).
96
See SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
97
Title III of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA“), “Legal
Certainty for Swap Agreements,” § 301(a) added § 206A(a)(3) to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (“GLBA”), which defined a CDS as a swap agreement. Section 301 went on to add §
206B to the GLBA, which defined a security-based swap agreement as a swap agreement
whose value is based on an underlying security. Section 301(b) then states that the term
“security” under subsection (a) had the same meaning as in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Therefore, security-based CDS is a security-based swap and these terms will be
used interchangeably in this memo. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit.3, § 301(a)–(b), 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§1-27f (2012)); see also Securities Act Release No. 33-9338, supra note 69, at 220.
98
SeeSecurities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I,, § 2(a)(1) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77b(a)(1) (West 2014)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, § 3(a)(10), 48
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(a)(10) (West 2014)).
99
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, tit. VII,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 761, 768, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
93
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2000 to 2010, Congress exempted security-based swaps from the definition
of “security” under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.100 Nevertheless, today, a CDS referencing an underlying security such as a residential
mortgage-backed security would be a security-based swap for purposes of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act.101
Accordingly, this gives rise to a two part inquiry: (1) whether the
exemption from 2000 to 2010 should be imputed to the Advisers Act for that
same time period; and (2) whether the failure of Congress to amend the Advisers Act to include the term “security-based swap” precludes CDSs from
meeting the definition of “security” under the statute. As explained below,
both are answered in the negative.
Importantly, Congress never intended to limit the scope of the definition of “security” under the Advisers Act.102 Rather, Congress exempted
security-based swaps, and therefore security-based CDSs, from the definition
of “security” under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act when it enacted the CFMA.103 Yet, Congress expressly preserved the SEC’s antifraud
enforcement authority with respect to such swaps.104 Significantly, Congress
reserved the question of whether a swap is a “security” in the savings clause
of section 304 of the CFMA, stating: “[n]othing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed as finding or implying that any
swap agreement is or is not a security for any purpose under the securities
laws.”105
Subsequently, Dodd-Frank unwound the CFMA’s narrow exemption
and added the term “security-based swap” in the definition of “security” in
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.106 Additionally, the SEC issued a
rule under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, which defined securitybased CDSs as securities.107 Neither the CFMA nor Dodd-Frank affected
See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E,
tit.3, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§1-27f); see also id.
101
See Public Offerings of Investment Contracts Providing for the Acquisition, Sale or
Servicing of Mortgages or Deeds of Trust, Securities Act Release No. 33-3892 (Jan. 31,
1958) (enumerating eleven factors to consider when determining whether a mortgage note
is a security).
102
See Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-2(a)(18) (West 2014).
103
See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app.E,
tit.3, 114 Stat. 2763 (providing “Legal Certainty for Swap Agreements”).
104
See Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., N.Y., 295 F.3d 312, 327 (2d Cir. 2002).
105
See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 304, 114
Stat. 2763.
106
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, tit. VII, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§761, 768, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010).
107
See Securities Act Release No. 33-9338, supra note 69, at 220 (July 18, 2012).
100

2015]

SUPERIOR SUPEREROGATION

251

the treatment of security-based swaps under the Advisers Act.108 Given this
legislative history, traditional canons of statutory construction should be
used to construe the definition of “security” under the Advisers Act.
Fundamentally, when the CFMA exempted security-based swaps from
the definition of “security” under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
while simultaneously preserving the SEC’s enforcement authority over such
swaps, Congress only intended to exempt security-based swaps from the
disclosure purposes of those acts.109 Further, Congress punted the question
of whether a security-based CDS is a “security” in the savings clause of
the CFMA, leaving the Advisers Act free to interpret a security-based
CDS as a “security.”110 Subsequently, when Dodd-Frank inserted the term
“security-based swap” in section 2(a)(1) and section 3(a)(10), omitting the
same in section 202(a)(18), it was an act of supererogation.111 There already
existed enough language in section 2(a)(1) and section 3(a)(10) to define a
security-based CDS as a “security,” through the derivatives clause.112 In
Tcherepnin, the Supreme Court found that omissions, such as not amending the Advisers Act to include “security-based swap,” have no controlling
significance.113 Thus, with respect to the Advisers Act, it was unnecessary
to put back what was never taken away. By altering the treatment of security-based swaps under the CFMA and Dodd-Frank, Congress did not
intend to affect when a person or entity was subject to the fiduciary duties
imposed on investment advisers.114 Therefore, as stated above, we need
only look to the text of section 202(a)(18) to find support for defining a
security-based CDS as a security.
108

Compare Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763, with 124 Stat. 1376, 1871.
109
See Caiola, 295 F.3d at 327.
110
Compare Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763 with 124 Stat. 1376, 1871.
111
See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 n.30 (1967) (“the exemption from
registration for insurance policies was clearly supererogation”); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 74 n.4 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring).
112
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (West 2014); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A § 78b(a)(10) (West 2014).
113
See Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 344.
114
Where Congress inserts a provision in only one of two statutes that deal with a closely
related subject, courts construe the omission as deliberate. See In re Fed. Mogul Global Inc.,
684 F.3d 355, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that Congress acts intentionally and purposely
in the disparate inclusion or exclusion). Additionally, because the purpose of an amendment
is to change the act being amended, courts should pause before reading statutes in pari
materia where an amendment is involved. See NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §51:3 (7th ed. 2012).
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CONCLUSION
Whether a security-based CDS is a “security” under the Advisers Act is a
novel question of law. As demonstrated, a security-based CDS is a “security”
by virtue of the “options clause” or the “evidence of indebtedness” language
of section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act. Furthermore, by appreciating
the history of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the Supreme
Court’s doctrine of supererogation neatly justifies Congress’ decision to pen
“security-based swap” into those statutes’ definition of “security.” Thus,
when a firm is engaged in the business of providing advice on security-based
CDSs for compensation, it meets the definition of “investment adviser”
under the Advisers Act.

